Urgent concern about non–compliancewith the transposition of ‘whistleblowing’ Directive (EU) 2019/1937 into Spanish national law
We are writing to bring to your attention our concerns regarding the transposition of the Directive on the protection of persons reporting on breaches of Union law (EU) 2019/1937–the ‘whistleblowing’ Directive –into Spanish national lawand to ask you to intervene as a matter of urgencytoalert the Spanish Governmentofthe risk of failing to comply with the EU Directive. The reason for the urgency is thedraft law is entering thefinal stageof the legislative process.
Draft law 121/00013–‘Proyecto de Ley reguladora de la protección de las personas que informen sobre infracciones normativas y de lucha contra la corrupción’1–was submitted to Parliament by the Government of Spain on the22September 2022 and approved by Congress onthe 23December 2022.
Serious concerns were raised by civil society that the proposal fails to properly protectwhistleblowers in Spain. Several proposed amendments to improve the draft were submitted by whistleblower protection experts. Several recommendations were successfullyimplemented byCongress, yet many critical amendments were not adopted. Therefore, Spain now risks adopting transposition legislation which does not protectwhistleblowers anddoes not conform with the minimum standard requirements of EU
Directive (2019/1937).
We understand the flawed amended draft law will be passed to the Senate on the 26 January 2023 and be put to a voteon or beforethe9February 2023.Amendments are permitted at this stage of the legislative process, but only on the 26 January andwe have been informed there is little political will to make further changes to the draft.Without intervention,it remainshighly likely that this flawed legislation will be adopted.
The adoption of this flawed legislation could be disastrous for whistleblowers in Spain and Europe where a harmonized whistleblower protection is essential in the fight against corruption, upholding the rule of law and the effective enforcement of EU Law.Further,while this may not be a matter directly relevant for the European Commission,we are concerned flawed legislation in Spain could become a flawed blueprint for whistleblower rights in Latin America.
We are in the process of doing a full assessmentwith our partners in Spainof the draft lawusing WIN’s InternationalBestPracticeCriteria forCompliance with EU Directive 2019/1937. We will send youthe reportas soon as it is available.
For the purposes of this letter and to highlight the urgency of the situation, we set outnineprovisionsin the draft law whichappear toviolate the required minimum standards of the EU Directive. We also set our recommended amendments.
1.Lack of protection for blowing the whistle on abuse of authority
Art. 2(1) of the draft law only protects disclosures of illegality for the EU and significant national laws–ie. “actions or omissions that may constitutea serious or very serious criminal or administrative offence.”This directly violates the Directive, whichalsorequires protection to cover reports exposing abuses of authorityand anything that “defeatsthe purpose” of rules.This is essential, because whistleblowers should not lose their rights if they are on the wrong side of legalistic boundaries between abuses of power
and technical illegality. Whistleblower laws challenge abuses of power through the truth. An abuse of authorityor reporting information aboutwrongdoingorharm to the public interestis notmisconductthat can be excluded from protection.
Recommendation1:For every reference to protection for exposing illegality,remove the terms “serious or very serious”andadd “or abuse of authority, orany matterthatthreatens or harms the public interest.
2.Protection only for whistleblowing through official channels
The draft law only offers rights when whistleblowers communicate protected information through official internal or external channels(Draft LawArt.1(1)).The Directive contains no audience loophole in its definition for internal reports, except that theyare internal(EU Dir.Art. 5(4)).2Nothingin the Directive requires whistleblowers to operate through those channels or forfeit theiranti–retaliationrights.
It isalsodysfunctional and would dramatically shrink the Directive’s protection. Allegations are only the tip of the iceberg for theflow of protected information necessary for organisations to function. Most of the time when protected information is communicated, it is not as an allegation.It is simply a matter of doing one’sjob to act on evidence or solve problems. The narrow channel only protecting allegations to theIAPIwill force employees to bypass the chain of command and flood the Independent Authority for the Protection of Informants (IAPI), the Spanish whistleblower office,whenever they need to act on politically sensitiveproblems or misconduct.TheIAPIwhistleblower officewill thenrefer the information back to the relevant agency with competence and expertise–the report’s origin. The bottom line is that this restriction means the draft law only would protectthe “tip”–a small percentageof those who need and deserveprotection–leaving the “iceberg” and therefore the vast majoritydefenseless.Further and importantly,it would delay getting vital whistleblowing information into the right hands, which is a primarypurpose of the Directive (EU Dir.Recital, para. 47)
TheIAPIand other channels should be a protected audience, but not the only audience where anti–retaliation rights apply. Those channels should be an available additional option to the normal chain of command when the person with protected information thinks thatusualforms of communication are too dangerous orwill failorbackfire.
Recommendation2:Art.1(1) of the draft law shouldclarifythatreporting via a normal chain of
commandis protected.
3.Loophole for disclosing publicly available information
Art. 35(2)(c) of the draft law permits retaliation for disclosing information about misconduct thatis alreadyon the public record.This violates the Directive, which contains no such loophole. No other nation has this loophole in its whistleblower laws,and the U.S. Whistleblower Protection Act explicitly rejects it as disqualifying protection. This arbitrary loophole also undermines the purpose of whistleblower laws. The overwhelming majority of information on the public record is buried and beyond the awareness of government officials. Often it becomes significant, only because whistleblowershighlightit through their reports or public disclosures.
Recommendation3:Cancel the loophole for disclosing publicly available information to prove misconduct.
4.Criminal liabilitylimiting thelegalprotectionto whistleblowers
According to the EU Directive, reporting persons shall not incur liabilityin respect of the acquisition of,or access to,theinformation which is reportedor publicly disclosed(EU Dir. Art21 (3)).Articles 18 and 38 of the draft lawdo not make it clearthat such liabilitywillnot arise unlessit isa self–standing crime not related totheobtaining oraccessing information as part of making areport or a disclosureunder the law. An example would bethreatening or harming the safety of others.This lack of clarity willhave a significant chilling effecton potential whistleblowersaspeople likeAntoine Deltour, whose whistleblowing case (as part of LuxLeaks) led inpart to theadoption of theEUDirective,would notbe
protected.
Recommendation 4: Remove criminal liability except with respect to self–standing criminal offences (for example, threats or harm to the safety of others) unrelated to the making of a report or disclosure of informationunder the law.
5.Directive’s burden of proof onlyapplies to proceedings for damages before courts or other authorities
The draft law is not sufficiently clear in this regard. First,itdoes not provide any competence for courts to assume jurisdiction over a whistleblower case, and second,the failure toapply this damages burden of proof to theIAPIor any other competent authority enforcing the law means that it flatly violates the Directive. To the contrary, outside the damages contextin the draft law,thereis no illegal retaliation unless whistleblowing was the “only” reason for an action(Draft law.Art. 36(2).This not only defies the Directive’s burden of proofbut isessentiallythe most hostile burdenin the history of whistleblowing rights. It will make it realistically impossible for theIAPIor any other body to find illegal retaliation.
Recommendation5:Apply the burdens of proofas perArticle 38(3)todecisions in any agency or
forum competentto enforce anti–retaliation rights.
6.Incomplete reverse burden of proof
In their limited context, the burdens of proof comply with the Directive with one significant exception: under Art. 38(4) the employer must prove that whistleblowing was “not linked” to the contested action. The Directive’srecitalsexplains that means it is not linked “in any way” to the alleged reprisal(seeRecital, para. 93). The distinction is critical.A premise for the Directive is that actions areillegal if contaminated by retaliation, even if there were mixed motives.It is not in compliance to approve actions would have occurred anyway because that were only 20–40% retaliatory. They must be uncontaminated–not linked “in any way”.
Recommendation 6:Add the phrase “in any way” after “linked under” in Article 38(4) of the draft law.
7.Lack of court access or due process
The draft law does not provide any right to due process or court access. Whilst there is a reference in Article 38(4) to court actions for damages,informal investigations bytheIAPIand local competent authoritiesare the only institutions currently identified as possibilities for enforcement, with no provision for judicial review of whatever decisions they are competent to make.This is even more concerning given thatunder the draft lawtheIAPIis being given investigatory powers(Draft Law Art.19)without having a judicial mandate to properly investigate.Due to resource limitations alone, a solely informal investigation by a remedial agency can only hope to have an anecdotal impact.It is no substitute for due process.
Limiting relief to the unreviewed discretion of a remedial agencyclearly violates the Directive, which describes an extensive process of judicial interpretation and review of administrative rulings. Recommendation5:Apply the burdens of proofas perArticle 38(3)todecisions in any agency or
forum competentto enforce anti–retaliation rights.
Recommendation 7:Add provisions that–1) As an alternative to a remedial investigation, the whistleblower law shall be entitled to a choice of forum for a due process proceeding in a court or employment tribunal; and 2)IAPI, other administrative or lower court rulings are subject to appellate judicial review.
8.Protection of those making anonymous reports is undermined by failure to ensure systems properly handle such communications and feedback
The draft law allows for a person reporting a concern to theIAPIto decide whether or notto report anonymously and sets out the rights of those who report, including therightto know the status and outcome of any investigation (Draft Law Art. 21). Articles 18 and 20 however, remove the right to be informed if the report was made anonymously. This legal uncertainty undermines the protections that are required by the EU Directive for those whose identities might become known after making a report and undermines the capacity of the authorities to build trust and confidence in their systems forhandling reports of wrongdoing properly and lawfully, particularly with respect to on–line systems that allow for continuous communication with anonymous sources.
9.Substantive scope of relief
The draft law is silent on what relief the prevailing whistleblower is entitled to receive. As a result, they can still “lose by winning.” The Directive requires a “make whole” remedy through “full compensation” for damages suffered. The draft law does not provide it.
Recommendation9:Add a provisionthatexplicitlygives prevailing whistleblowers the right to a “make
whole” remedy, including damages, that eliminates the direct and indirect effects of illegal retaliation.
Finally, we are concerned that the Spanish authorities are not ensuring thatNGOs, who have been the main channels of support for whistleblowers and who have worked collaboratively with all levels of governmentin that countryto implement safe and effectiveon–linereporting platforms and to advise and support whistleblowers,are not protected asfacilitators under the Spanishtransposition draft.We see this as further evidence of afailure to properly consult with stakeholders and a lack of seriouspolitical commitmentto transpose the EU Directiveon the protectionof whistleblowers (2019/1937)effectively and positively.
As stated at the outset, we will send you our full analysisonce it is completed, but we wanted to get this letter to you as a matter of urgency with respect to the potentially serious areas of non–compliance that we have identified in Spain’s draft law to transpose the EU Directive on whistleblower protection.We remain very concerned by the trend we arewitnessing amongmanyEU Member States touse the Directive asan excuseto reduce existing protectionsor to implement its standards in such a restrictive waythat it defeats both the spirit and the letter of the law. It is therefore vital that the Commissionis fully aware of these problems and advisesMember States, including Spain,at the earliest opportunity of the risk they run of being non–compliant with the EU Directive.
Yours faithfully,
Anna Myers
Executive Director of WIN
On behalf of WIN’s Board of Trustees:
Vladimir Radomirović–(Chair of WIN’s Board of Trustees) Editor–in–Chief of Pištaljka (Serbia)
Cathy James–(Vice Chair of WIN’s Board of Trustees) Legal Expert & Practicing Solicitor (UK)
John Devitt–Chief Executive, Transparency International Ireland
Giorgio Fraschini–Whistleblowing Programme Manager, Transparency International Italy
Annegret Falter–Chair, Whistleblower–NetzwerkE.V.(Germany)
Tom Devine–Legal Director at Government Accountability Project (USA)
Chido Onumah–Coordinator of the African Centre for Media & Information (Nigeria)
David Hutton–Senior Fellow of the Centre for Free Expression Whistleblowing Initiative (Canada)